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In this paper I will single out for discussion two aspects of what I take to be a user-friendly
argument evaluation procedure. “Top billing” will be given to a method for incorporating arguer
credibility in the procedure, after which I want to present a solution to a problem arising from
regarding conclusion probability as the mathematical product of joint premise probability and
inference claim probability.
Very commonly, proposers of argument evaluation procedures (including this writer) have
taken the view that the recipient of an argument (H) should evaluate the argument using only
information they had prior to the utterance of the argument by the arguer (S).
The need to rely on such prior information is obvious, but the logical person will take into
account all information at their disposal that is relevant to making a judgement about the logical
merit of an argument. I want to argue that this principle implies the need to take arguer epistemic
credibility into account. For example, H ought to regard a particular premise as having a higher
probability on some occasion because they regard the arguer as being epistemically trustworthy
on the topic.
It might be thought that taking such a step amounts to surrendering some of one’s logical or
epistemic autonomy. After all, taking a claim to be true on arguer say-so seems to amount to the
surrendering of such autonomy. It may, for some, seem to qualify as a “leap of faith”, a concept
that evokes uneasiness in philosophers, if not contempt.
The position I want to defend is this: logical autonomy requires taking all evidence available
to us into account when evaluating claims, and if we know that S is in a position to know that
her/his premise is true, this fact counts as indirect evidence for the premise. Sometimes, indeed,
all we have to go on is S's expertise.
Consider this example. We are at a plant nursery looking for some nice perennials for our
back yard. Our eye is drawn to some pansies, and we ask a busy sales clerk if they are perennials
or annuals (pansies come in both versions). She says: "They are perennials.", and rushes off to
answer a query by another customer. We personally cannot tell the difference between the two
kinds of pansies, and she has given no reason for saying they are perennials. Should we buy
some? This is a matter of whether we now believe they are indeed perennials. What information
do we have to rely on to conclude they are? We do have some information - we have the clerk's
word for it. Is this a good reason? It is if we believe that plant-store clerks are knowledgeable
about such matters. If we take this clerk to be reasonably typical in this respect, we can say we
have "authority support" for the claim that these flowers are perennials, that this is a sufficient
reason to believe that they are. (By “sufficient reason” I do not mean that the premise guarantees
the truth of this conclusion. I only mean that it renders conclusion probability high enough to
warrant taking it to be true.)
Does this pansy-buying scenario involve a surrender of logical autonomy? No, because we
have independent information about the expertise of plant-store clerks. That is, we may have
prior experience of the dependability of such people, or we may know that the stores teach their
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clerks about the properties of the plants they sell. Contrast this scenario with a different one. We
go to the store, take an interest in the pansies we see there, and ask another customer whether or
not they are perennials, without investigating the background of that person in plant knowledge.
Suppose the person says that the plants are perennials. In this case, taking their word for it does
amount to surrendering our logical autonomy, and taking a leap of faith that cannot be logically
defended. We have no objective basis for assigning credibility to this other person. They may in
fact be knowledgeable, but if we have no information about them we are not entitled to assume
they do.
The first example suggests that it can be logical and rational to take a claim as true based on
someone's say-so. (There are two bases for doing this: either the person is known to have
expertise on the topic, or they have observation ("eyewitness") knowledge.) The good critical
thinker takes all relevant information available to her/him into account, and one kind is
information relating to authority support.
I believe, then, that any adequate evaluation procedure must accommodate the availability of
indirect evidence reflecting authority support for premises, and perhaps for inference claims too.
In what follows I describe an evaluation procedure that does this.
Suppose someone (S) directs an argument of the form ‘P, so C.’ to an intended recipient H.
Suppose this is, as the form suggests, a single-inference argument with one or more premises.
“P” stands for the set of premises intended by S to get H to believe that C.
The first issue for H is whether or not he/she already believes that C. If so, H has no
evaluating to do and the process ends.
If H does not already accept C, then H must start out on the argument evaluation process.
The first task is to decide whether or not a premise is favorably relevant to C. The standard
criterion used is: would coming to believe P make C seem more likely? Since relevance is a
matter of semantic content, if H understands the propositions P and C, they are in a good position
to take this step correctly. If P appears to H to be irrelevant, H can set it aside without troubling
to determine its truth-value. This is what would happen if S’s argument represented a typical
case of one of the relevance fallacies.
If it is a single-premise argument, H is now finished. S has failed to persuade H to accept C
as true. If there is at least one other premise, H completes the above process for it. Let us suppose
that there is at least one premise that H regards as favorably relevant to C.
The next step, of course, is to determine what truth-value ought to be assigned to P. H first
invokes her/his own previously acquired information to reach a judgment. For several reasons it
is desirable to express the outcome of the evaluation process in probabilistic terms, such as: “P is
more likely false than true”, “P is as likely false as true”, “P is more likely true than false”, “P is
very likely true”, etc. If the judgment is highly favorable, such as the last of these, H is logically
entitled to accept P as true.
What if the judgment is less positive, such that H is not entitled to accept P as true? Some
systems of argument evaluation would have H set P aside, and move to evaluate another premise,
if there is one. But this may be ignoring some information H has, information about S’s
reliability as a source of information on the topic P is about. Such information is only indirect
evidence for C because, when appropriate, accepting P as true on the basis of epistemic authority
involves an inference step. That is, we reason in this form: S affirms that P, so P.
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Probability theory tells us that, given an argument of the above form, we can write:
p(P) = p(S affirms that P) x p(P/S affirms that P)

This can be simplified in the argument evaluation context by noting that p(S affirms that P)
= 1, since H knows that P affirms that P from S’s having uttered it. We can now write:
p(P) = p(P/S affirms that P)

How do we get a value for the right-hand parameter? Instinctively, some people answer that
it represents the reliability of S in the subject area to which P belongs. For example, if S has a
“track record” of getting things right 80% of the time, then one might think that the right-hand
side value is 0.8. But this would be a mistake. The 0.8 reliability value actually is for the
parameter p(S affirms that P/P), the converse of the parameter we are interested in. That is, S
affirms that P is true 80% of the time when P is actually true. So how do we establish a value for
p(P/S affirms that P)? The answer, of course, is provided by Bayes’ Theorem, which for present
purposes can be written as:
p(P/S affirms that P) = [p(P)i x R] / [(p(P)i x R) + ((1 - p(P)i) x (1 - R))]

Here R stands for arguer reliability, S’s track record on the topic area to which P belongs.
The expression “p(P)i” stands for the probability value that H would assign to P using only
information H possessed prior to being in receipt of the argument. This is commonly called the
“base rate” in statistics.
As is obvious from the algebraic form of the Bayes’s Theorem, the challenge we face at this
juncture is how to make it practically useful in our argument evaluation procedure. As it stands,
the formula is too complex to be used by most of us except by using a calculator. On the other
hand, cognitive psychologists have demonstrated that the heuristic approach that we
characteristically use as a substitute is not reliable. The most notorious example in the cognitive
psychology literature is Tversky and Kahneman’s taxicab example.
"A cab was involved in a hit and run accident at night. Two cab companies, the Green
and the Blue, operate in the city. You are given the following data: (a) 85% of the cabs in
the city are Green and 15% are Blue, (b) a witness identified the cab as Blue. The court
tested the reliability of the witness under the same circumstances that existed on the night
of the accident and concluded that the witness correctly identified each one of the two
colors 80% of the time and failed 20% of the time. What is the probability that the cab
involved in the accident was Blue rather than Green?" Tversky & Kahneman (1982, 156)

Most people give a wildly inaccurate answer to the question, which suggests that we need to
rely on a formula, but it must be a very simple one that yields reasonably accurate results.
To create one I calculated values for the Bayes equation for different appropriate pairs of R
and p(P)i values, then ran a linear regression analysis to identify a linear function that most
closely fitted the calculated values. A surprisingly simple function was found to be reasonably
accurate, one with considerable intuitive plausibility. It is this:
p(P) = p(P)i + (R - 0.5)

For convenience, I will call "p(P)i" the “direct support” for P that H has. The "R - 0.5" part
will be called the “authority support” for P.
This formula has to be understood in a certain way. First, it can give values greater than 1,
but since p(P) cannot exceed 1, we must understand values above this to indicate that p(P) is 1.
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Secondly, we do not use it when R is less than 0.5, because then the authority support would be
negative, resulting in p(P) being less than p(P)i. This is not an acceptable outcome. If S's
reliability is less than 0.5, we simply ignore their testimony and take p(P) to be p(P)i, the value
we would give it independently.
Subtracting the 0.5 from R to get the authority support has intuitive appeal. Consider a case
in which S's credibility with H is 0.5. This value reflects a judgment that S is correct about
claims on the topic half the time, and incorrect half the time. In other words, H might as well flip
a coin as listen to S's opinion, which is another way of saying that S's affirming P in itself
provides no authority support for P. Thus, we want a formula for p(P) that gives us p(P)i as the
value when R is 0.5, and the above one does.
Consider another scenario, one in which H has no pre-existing evidence for or against P, but
H is willing to believe P if S affirms it. Here p(P)i is 0.5 for H (as likely true as false), and R is 1.
Plugging these values into our formula we get p(P) = 0.5 + (1 - 0.5) = 1, which means that H
regards P as true because S says so. This is the result we should expect, so our formula is correct
for these two scenarios.
How close to the Bayes’ Theorem results are the results using the simplified formula? If we
calculate p(P) for any pair of values for p(P)i and R using the two formulas and round off to one
decimal place (0.9, 0.8, etc.), the simple formula will yield a value within one decimal place
almost always. (That is, the error is +/- 0.1.) For everyday purposes this is pretty accurate. For
example, in the cab example we have p(P)i = 0.15 and R = 0.8. Thus, p(Cab is Blue/S affirms the
cab is Blue) = 0.15 + (0.8 - 0.5) = 0.45. The correct value is 0.41. Not bad! A lot better than the
0.8 value most people give when tested.
The simplified formula is least accurate when p(P)i is very high or very low. But when it is
high we can accept P as true without taking R into account, so we don't need the formula.
Because of its algebraic form, the simple formula allows us to simply add authority support
to the direct support. Thus, if H did not regard the probability of P as high enough to warrant
accepting P as true before, the additional authority support might bring P’s probability up enough
to warrant accepting P. If it does not add enough, then our judgment is that P cannot be used, by
itself or in conjunction with other premises, to prove C, since we do not accept P as true.
Often people furnish more than one premise to try to persuade us, so we have to go through
the procedure for each one. All unacceptable ones are set aside and we consider the question of
whether the remaining premises make C likely enough to accept it as true.
This practice of setting aside premises that cannot be accepted as true has not been the
orthodox way of dealing with premises in evaluation systems that use probability values.
Heretofore it has not been included in systems I myself have devised, but I have come to regard
it as a practically useful and logically legitimate strategy for several reasons.
First, it simplifies the inference evaluation process when one does not accept a premise as
true. One discards it, so that deciding if the remaining premises are sufficient to warrant
accepting the conclusion is less complex. From this perspective, and pedagogically, the fewer
premises the better. And if no premise is acceptable then no inference evaluation need be done.
Secondly, it allows us to deal effectively with what a colleague of mine calls the “Podunk
problem”. In my 1984 text, I presented the following invented example: “Students at Podunk
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University study very little [in their free time]. Most students at Podunk have part-time jobs.
Therefore, Podunk students don’t learn a lot in college” (1984, 44).
This little argument has the form ‘P1. P2. Therefore C.’, and can be diagramed in a “V”
form, an instance of the convergent pattern. Two logically independent premises are given to
prove the conclusion. Now suppose we have to evaluate this argument (perhaps we are thinking
of sending one of our children to Podunk and a friend, knowing this, directs this argument to us).
Now suppose we know that Podunk is located in a very small town that offers no opportunity for
part-time employment. On this basis we regard the second premise as unacceptable.
This situation presents a problem if conclusion probability is regarded as determined by p(P)
x p(C/P), where P represents the set of premises and p(P) their joint probability. Taking both
premises into account will yield a p(P) value of zero, since p(P) = p(P1) x p(P2), and p(P2) = 0.
And with p(P) = 0, p(C) = 0. Thus, we would, using this approach, have to judge the argument as
worthless, even though it contains a premise (P1) that we may think is good enough to warrant
accepting the conclusion as true. This result is too paradoxical to be acceptable.
In the procedure advocated here, we simply set aside the false second premise and evaluate
the inference quality of the revised argument. That is, is the first premise sufficient to get us to
accept the conclusion? If I found it was indeed true, I would say “yes”.
Now let’s look briefly at a three-assertion “chain” argument to see how the “set aside”
strategy works in these cases: “Podunk students spend lots of time working at part-time jobs, so
they have more money than the average university student. Therefore, they have smaller student
loans than the average university student.”
This is a chain argument that can be symbolized as ‘A, so B. Therefore C.’. Having decided
that A is favorably relevant to B, I need to arrive at a truth value judgment of A. If, as before, I
find that Podunk University is in a small town with few part-time job openings, I will judge A to
be false. Setting A aside, I now have an argument of the form ‘B. Therefore C.’ Now I need to
evaluate B as a premise. This would require a survey of a sample of students, and data on
university students elsewhere in the country. If I am unwilling to do the research, then I will be
unable to decide whether or not B makes C probable enough to regard C as true. Thus, the
argument cannot convince me that C is true. I have, in effect, set B aside also.
Behind the “setting-aside” strategy is the principle that an argument cannot persuade an
evaluator to accept its conclusion unless the evaluator decides that at least one of the basic
premises and the corresponding inference claim can be taken to be true. While one could reach a
judgment, using probability values, that the conclusion can be assigned a certain probability
value, this appraisal of the argument is not of much practical interest to the typical argument
“consumer” unless the value is high enough to warrant regarding the conclusion as true. This
lack of interest might be seen as philistinism by one who wants an appraisal of the logical worth
of arguments regardless of their worth, but the other party can defend their evaluation strategy by
appealing to its efficiency. Less mental effort and, consequently, less time is expended. And both
parties might agree that life is short!
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